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Abstract 
 
This article focuses on the relation to the Other - the underlying aspect of dialogism - in the 
works of Mikhail Bakhtin. His approach to heterology (science or knowledge of the Other) is 
fundamental to analysis of such themes of his oeuvre as carnival (laughter), history, and 
economy of human existence. On a certain stage it appears, that two configurations may be 
distinguished in Bakhtin's conception of the Other. First, the Other dominated and 
appropriated by the subject, or Author, or Self in the dialogic relation – it is only a provisional 
Other. The second is the irreducible Other, outside the possibility of adequate knowledge and 
thus potentially excluded from dialogue. Thus, the end of dialogue, the silence remains as a 
dark shadow on the horizon of the meaningful discursive logic. Moreover, the concepts of 
meaning and truth itself seem to be jeopardized here, since “answers to questions is what I call 
‘meanings’” (Bakhtin). Nevertheless, Bakhtin never openly questions the fundamental values 
of knowledge and final truth; his position may be summed up thus: “The truth is out there. 
Only it is probably not cognizable to an individual. Or may be not to anybody”. 
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo tem como foco a relação com o Outro – o aspecto subjacente do dialogismo – nas 
obras de Mikhail Bakhtin. Sua abordagem da heterologia (a ciência ou conhecimento sobre o 
Outro) é fundamental para uma análise de temas como o carnaval (riso), a história e a 
economia da existência humana, objetos de sua investigação teórica. Em certa etapa de seu 
pensamento, parece que sua concepção de Outro se distingue em duas configurações. 
Primeiro, o Outro dominado e apropriado pelo sujeito, ou pelo Autor, ou pelo Eu na relação 
dialógica – é apenas um Outro provisório. O segundo é o Outro irredutível, além da 
possibilidade de conhecimento adequado e, portanto, potencialmente excluído do diálogo. 
Assim, o fim do diálogo, o silêncio, permanece como uma sombra obscura no horizonte da 
lógica discursiva significante. Além disso, os conceitos de significado e verdade em si parecem 
ser prejudicados aqui, já que “respostas às perguntas constituem o que eu chamo de 
‘significados’” (Bakhtin). Entretanto, Bakhtin nunca questiona abertamente os valores 
fundamentais de conhecimento e verdade definitiva; sua posição pode ser dada assim: “A 
verdade está lá fora. Só que provavelmente não é cognoscível a um indivíduo. Ou talvez não 
seja a nenhum”. 
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Texto integral 
 
In his writings on Bakhtin, Tzvetan Todorov (and subsequently American 
translators of Todorov's books) translates 'raznorech'e,' one of Bakhtin's 
cornerstone notions, as 'hétérologie' (heterology, science or knowledge of the 
Other).1 While Emerson and Holquist's 'heteroglossia' (in The Dialogic 
Imagination) may be closer to the Russian term, Todorov's translation is fully 
legitimate: a possible stress on the aspect of 'logos'- thought, knowledge (as in 
'logic') as well as on the aspect of 'logos'- word (as in 'philology') is meaningful 
given the global scope and implications of Bakhtin's ideas. In fact, such 
fundamental aspects of Bakhtin's heterology as carnival (laughter), history (time 
and space), economy (appropriation versus expenditure) are all related to the key 
concept of his world outlook--dialogism--which, in turn, is rooted in Bakhtin's 
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theory of discourse. The relation to the Other - the underlying aspect of dialogism - 
is the focus of this essay. 
By definition, dialogue presupposes some kind of communication, verbal par 
excellence, with another interlocutor. In Bakhtin's works, dialogue manifests itself, 
depending on the level of complexity and on the area of implementation (e.g. 
literary discourse proper vs. history), in a synonymous chain: double- and 
polyvoicedness (mnogogolosost'), polyglossia (mnogoiazychie), heteroglossia in 
additionally varying aspects (raznorech'e, raznogolosost', raznoiazychie), 
polyphony, hybridization and so forth. These terms have their antonyms in 
monologue, homology, one-voicedness and so forth. The limits of dialogism are 
posed: on one hand it is 'the mutual nonunderstanding represented by people who 
speak in different languages.'2 This limit is considered by Bakhtin to be only a 
provisional one, in view of the general ability of, and the modern world tendency 
to, learning other languages. On the other hand, there is another limit that is 
altogether more important and indicated in opposition to the very principle of 
dialogism: this is the word removed from live communication--the monological, 
and first of all, the authoritative word. (It is worth indicating that for Bakhtin, as is 
generally the case in Russian, 'word' can also mean 'speech,' 'discourse,' and even 
'language,' depending on the context, although more exact equivalents for all these 
notions exist as well.) 
The immediate implication of this premise is the whole system of subsequent 
oppositions operative in Bakhtin's conception; most importantly, the interactive 
essence of the dialogical word is opposed to a static word of the language 
understood as a stable structure (Saussurean 'langage'), and the social dimension 
of dialogue to individualistic tendencies. At this point, I will focus on the following, 
closely interconnected, aspects of dialogism. 
The staple of carnivalesque and dialogized culture is its collective, anti-
individualist basis. Even leaving aside the radical formulations of Rabelais and his 
World, where the individual is sometimes seen as nothing more than a 'fertilizer' 
for the growth of the collective, formulations like the following are 
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typical:Oppositions between individuals are only surface upheavals of the untamed 
elements in social heteroglossia, surface manifestations of those elements that play 
on such individual oppositions, make them contradictory, saturate their 
consciousness and discourses with a more fundamental speech diversity. (DN, p. 
326) 
In Bakhtin's theory of literary genres, individual is the main characteristic of 
poetry, which opposes it to the dialogical genre par excellence, the novel (DN, pp. 
264, 329 et passim). In fact, the poetic and the novelistic become representative of 
the forces underlying all social, linguistic, and literary phenomena: 'At the time 
when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the influence of 
the unifying, centralizing, centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the novel - 
and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it - was being historically 
shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces' (pp. 272-73). Thus, 
poetry is essentially 'single-voiced,' unlike the 'authentic double-voicedness' of the 
novel. Furthermore, poetry operates with what Bakhtin calls 'direct word' that 
'acknowledges only itself (that is, only its own context), its own object, its own 
direct expression and its own unitary and singular language' (p.276). In turn, this 
[u]nitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical 
processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the 
centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given [dan] but 
is always in essence posited [zadan] - and at every moment of its linguistic life it is 
opposed to the realities of the heteroglossia. (p. 270). 
However, some important correlations complicate the concept of dialogism 
at this point. 'Every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there are 
no words with meanings shared by all, no words 'belonging to no one'' (p. 401). In 
fact, it makes sense that the dialogized word is opposed to the dogmatic one, as 
unique is opposed to unitary; such a uniqueness is, at least in part, constituted by 
the individuality of the personalized interlocutor. Thus, in Bakhtin's words to this 
effect: the 'authentic environment of the utterance, the environment in which it 
lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as 
language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as 
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an individual utterance' (p. 272; emphasis added). Actually, in one short paragraph 
Bakhtin manages to oppose the 'poet's individuality  as reflected in his language 
and speech' to the 'social heteroglossia and the variety of individual voices in it, the 
prerequisite for authentic novelistic prose' (p. 264; emphasis added). In addition, 
the same individual poetic idiom is actually equated in the same text ('Discourse in 
the Novel') with a 'common unitary language' and a 'system of linguistic norms' (p. 
270; emphasis added). All this requires some further analysis; for now, though, I 
will turn to another, yet closely related, aspect of dialogism. 
 The direct, individual, poetic word is formally and essentially completed or 
finalized (zaversheno), whereas the dialogized, carnivalistic, novelistic word is 
always open to heteroglot operation and is never finalized. Thus, in Dostoevsky's 
novels, 'nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the 
world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, 
everything is still in the future and will always be in the future.'3 In fact, the 
opposition between the always contextual dialogized word and the opaque, 
finalized word leads Bakhtin to the implicit and sometimes explicit valuation of 
speech and utterance in live form over the written - and thus, in a certain sense, 
finalized - text.4  
 Here we should recall the economical basis for the dialogized culture of the 
carnival - the economy of appropriation. Thus, Bakhtin notes that 'Paul Lehmann 
states outright that the history of medieval literature and its Latin literature in 
particular "is the history of appropriation, re-working and imitation of someone's 
else property" . . . --or as we would say, of another's language, another's style, 
another's word.'5 The juxtaposition of word with material property here is 
characteristic, for the very essence or force motrice for the collective progress of 
humanity in the carnavalesque conception is the 'material surplus,' quantitative 
growth of matter, and the consequent valuation of the thing.6 This opaqueness and 
materiality obviously contradicts the above stated “openendedness” 
(nezavershennost') of the dialogized word. The following complicates the argument 
even further. 
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 The problem of reification on the ethical plane is (at some point at least) 
interpreted by Bakhtin in unambiguously Marxist terms: man becomes thing in 
class society, particularly under capitalism, where the 'reifying devaluation of man 
had permeated into . . . the very foundations of human thinking' (PDP, p. 62). 'This 
is violence in all possible forms of its manifestation: economical, political, 
ideological; it is not possible to fight these forces except on the exterior plane and 
by exterior means (a justified revolutionary violence). Personal self is what is at 
stake in this fight.'7 This confrontational premise leads to certain deterministic 
aspects of Bakhtin's heterology, or, to use de Man's expression, to 'dialectical 
imperialism' in Bakhtin's dialogism with its ideologically sanctioned violence. 
Speaking about discourse proper, it 'is still warm from that [social] struggle and 
hostility, as yet unresolved and still fraught with hostile intentions and accents'; 
generally, Bakhtin's dialogical vocabulary is saturated with the spirit of aggressive 
confrontation and military-style terminology such as 'enemy territory,' 'borders,' 
'resistance,' 'domination' and so forth (DN, p. 331 and passim). The ideological 
premise of the Marxist class struggle provides, in fact, one more reason for the 
anti-poetical stance: in a convincing intrepretation of Mikhail Gasparov, Bakhtin - a 
'man of a new culture' - attacks poetry as a traditional 'high' genre in the literary 
hierarchy.8  
 Subtracted from the personalized dialogical exchange (for instance, 
between the speaker or author, and the listener or reader), the word also runs the 
danger of reification (e.g. poetical word) (DN, p. 346). Hence the all-important 
opposition of '[t]he thing and person (subject) as the limits of cognition' ('K 
metodologii', 383/161 et passim). The most important second part of Bakhtin's 
syllogism is the opposition of thing to sense (meaning) (pp. 385/162, 387/164). 
Thus, the subject (self) participating in dialogue, and a meaning correlated to the 
dialogized word, are interdependent and to a certain extent are a precondition of 
each other. With all this, '[o]ne must not forget that thing and person are limits and 
not absolute substances' (p. 387/164-65). So that even a reified substance can and 
should be 'turned into a meaningful context for the thinking, speaking and 
(creatively) acting individual' (ibid.; emphasis added). Thus, opposite processes are 
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always (potentially) at play: 'reification and personalization,' recognizable as 
versions of centripetal and centrifugal forces (pp. 391, 392/168). However, as we 
already saw, it is precisely the opaqueness, crystallization, and reification of the 
individualized word (poetic, authoritarian, centripetal) and to some extent of the 
written--materialized in brute matter--text, that opposes it to the openness and 
incompleteness (nezavershennost') of the dialogized word. 
 The indicated problems are interrelated; in the final analysis they lead to 
the 'last questions' of Bakhtin's heterology.9 At this point, however, I would like to 
turn to the question of the (relative) inherent otherness contained in the figure of 
Bakhtin-the author. 
 Frequent allusions to Goethe in Bakhtin's works are by no means accidental 
occurrences. In fact, from various materials and especially from those prepared for, 
and used in, The Bildungsroman and its Significance in the History of Realism, 
Russian researchers have concluded that 'it becomes clear that Goethe, alongside 
Dostoevsky and Rabelais, was the third principal protagonist in Bakhtin's creative 
oeuvre' (EST86, p.415 n).10 It is important to underscore that no clear-cut 
chronological or thematic boundaries divide Bakhtin's work into a 'Dostoevsky 
period,' 'Rabelais period,' or 'Goethe period'; references to Rabelais abound in the 
works on Dostoevsky, while those on Goethe abound in Rabelais and his World. 
One might see here a manifestation of the principle of dialogism, where words, 
names and ideas enter into an unencumbered open dialogue as well as into a 
struggle. At the same time, considering Bakhtin's truly panoramic outlook, one 
could conjecture that he would in some way group his manifold ideas in and 
around the proposed thematical clusters. In fact, the suggestion of such a grouping 
move seems to find confirmation in Bakhtin's own observations of strategic 
character, as well as when one considers his oeuvre as a whole - from a thematic 
angle. Thus, in several contexts he juxtaposes, and to a large extent opposes, 
aesthetics to ethics and to gnoseology.11 If we provisionally accept the possibility 
of a thematic division, precisely this tripartite structure can be discerned, with 
concentrations on problematic of an aesthetical, ethical, and gnoseological order. 
Focusing on a representative figure for these three thematic clusters, we may to a 
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certain extent identify them with, respectively, Goethe (aesthetics), Rabelais 
(ethics: Bakhtin's 'philosophy of act') and Dostoevsky (generally, gnoseology). 
  In their overviews of Bakhtin's work, such authorities as Holquist, Clark, 
Emerson, Todorov, and Morson all seem to agree on the desirability of 
differentiating between several stages in Bakhtin's creative biography (their 
approaches, however, focus on different aspects than the ones proposed here). 
Such conventional periodization seems to be as justified as a simultaneous 
recognition of an overall coherent pattern, which allows us to speak about the 
unity of Bakhtin's thought. So we may tentatively discern Bakhtin of the 'earlier' 
works (concentration on aesthetics); the 'canonical' Bakhtin (ethics, action); and 
the later Bakhtin ('Dostoevsky' and gnoseology). Despite the fact that in the unity 
of 'Bakhtin's world' the chronological division is mostly conventional (especially 
due to the fact that Bakhtin sometimes worked on his texts for decades, reworking, 
revising and publishing new versions), I will refer to this periodization on those 
occasions when it involves some meaningful turn in analysis. 
 The 'Dostoevsky' pole, in particular, presents a certain difficulty in addition 
to chronological overlappings and intersections. If such works as 'Author and Hero 
in Aesthetic Activity' or Rabelais and His World to some extent bear out the 
principle of thematic unity (respectively, aesthetics and ethics), the works on 
Dostoevsky, along with gnoseological problematics, deal extensively with aesthetic 
and ethics. Again, however, this question itself can be approached in the spirit of 
the universality of dialogism which, for Bakhtin, is a truly dialectical philosophical 
principle: 'Dialectics was born from dialogue, in order to return to it on a higher 
level' (K metodologii, p. 384/162).12 In any case, whether we call it dialectics or 
dialogism, the 'Dostoevsky' or generally speaking gnoseological, pole of the 
proposed tripartite structure would correspond to the Aufhebung of the dialectical 
synthesis, where the opposition of thesis and antithesis (or inherent contradictions 
that in fact occur between Bakhtin's aesthetics and ethics, or 'Goethe' and 
'Rabelais') would be relieved. For instance, in the 'Rabelaisian' action nexus of 
Bakhtin's oeuvre, the problem of individuality versus collectivity seems to be 
'resolved' in a straightforward manner in favor of the 'collective body' and 
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collective consciousness. Nevertheless, some issues therein were differently 
approached in Bakhtin's writings related to the conventional 'aesthetics' or 
'Goethe' pole. Thus, the analysis of subjectivity in art and literature is the focus of 
such works as 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity' and 'The Problem of Content, 
Material, and Form in Verbal Creative Art,' both written in the 1920s. And, 
moreover, Bakhtin continued to elaborate the problematic of subjectivity in his 
much later works - that is, it remained a central theme in the conventionally 
gnoseological, or rather synthetic, 'Dostoevsky' corpus (i.e., in the revised edition 
of the book on Dostoevsky, as well as in his notes and drafts from the 1970s). 
 In terms of a concern for methodological rigor, it is important that Bakhtin 
himself practices and formulates grounds for a simultaneous analysis of discourse 
from aesthetical as well as from epistemological and ethical angles, since the 
principle of dialogism is relevant to all planes of human existence (cf., e.g. DN, pp. 
337-38). In this vein, for instance, the 'carnival sense of the world helps 
Dostoevsky overcome gnoseological as well as ethical solipsism' (PDP, p. 177). 
 The quotation continues: 'A single person, remaining alone with himself, 
cannot make ends meet even in the deepest and most intimate spheres of his own 
spiritual life, he cannot manage without another consciousness. One person can 
never find complete fulness in himself alone.' We are back to the issue of the Other 
proper. 
The problem of the Other is thus formulated by Bakhtin: 
 
The I and the other are the fundamental value-categories that for 
the first time make possible any actual valuation, and the moment 
of valuation or, rather, that of the valuational attitude of 
consciousness, is present not only in an act proper, but also in 
every lived experience and even in the simplest sensation: to live 
means to take an axiological stand in every moment of one's life or 
to position oneself with respect to values. (AH, pp. 187-88) 
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This position is indicated in the cornerstone notion of exotopy (in some 
earlier texts, 'transgredience'). In fact, exotopy continued to be one of the main 
props in Bakhtin's theoretical thought from his early works to the last years. 
Essentially it is based on the empirical observation that we cannot perceive, 
conceive of, or represent ourselves with absolute exactness: just as we cannot see 
the back of our head, we cannot comprehend our own birth or death. Of course, the 
ramifications and implications of this premise extend very far, but I will 
concentrate on the following fundamental moment: the fullness of self-being 
denied to being (esthetically as well as emotionally and cognitively), '[t]he values 
of being a qualitatively defined personality are inherent only to another' ('Avtor i 
geroi', p. 99/105). In other words, any qualitatively adequate evaluation, 
description, knowledge of anything or of anybody is possible only from an exterior 
position. The basic example of exotopy is the relation of the author to the hero in 
his creation.  
 Even if in some early instances Bakhtin differentiates--never very 
consistently--between application of the exotopical principle to the esthetical, 
ethical and gnoseological spheres, it fast (often on the same page with a 
differentiation) becomes quite universal. Thus, in 'The Problem of Content, 
Material and Form in Verbal Art': 'We shall subsequently illuminate the role of the 
creative personality of the author as a constitutive moment in artistic form; it is 
within the unity of his activity that the cognitive and ethical moment finds its 
unification'.13 
 The exotopical position of the subject creates what Bakhtin calls a 'surplus 
of vision and knowledge of the author in relation to every one of his heros' ('Avtor i 
geroi', pp. 16/12, 27/24-25; 'K pererabotke, p. 343; 'Epic and Novel', p. 32; et 
passim)14. This coupling of the visual with the cognitive and the general 'process of 
the conclusive spherization and unification of the real world' are positively 
exemplified in Goethe, for whom, 'as is widely known, . . . the seeing eye was the 
center, the first and last authority.'15 Bakhtin's position is extremely characteristic 
in terms of the conclusively logocentric metaphoricity of eye and circle 
(preeminently Hegelian, as discussed by Derrida in 'La mythologie blanche'). 
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 Furthermore, for Bakhtin, the author is the embracing and framing 
'consciousness of the consciousness,' endowed with a surplus of meaning (sense) 
conversely with the surplus of word, and that of truth ('Avtor i geroi', pp. 16/12, 
18/14-15, 175/190-91).16 Thus, for instance, 'the author-spectator always 
embraces temporally the whole; he always succeeds, and not only temporally, but 
in meaning' ('Avtor i geroi', p. 110/118; I will return to this temporal aspect). This 
hierarchical structure reserves for the author a stable position not in existence but 
in 'superexistence' ('Iz 70-71', p. 361/136-37; emphasis added). 
 In terms of appropriation, the subject acts somewhat like the Borg from the 
used-to-be popular Star Trek TV series: after 'self-implantation' into (the world of) 
the other, (s)he literally feeds on the other's life and its sufferings in order to 
accumulate them as valuables and then to return to the exotopical position of the 
superbeing ('Avtor i geroi', pp. 20/17, 27-29/24-27). Again, this exotopical 
program is not restricted to the sphere of aesthetics, since 
 
only from this place the material acquired by self-implantation 
may be comprehended ethically, cognitively, or aesthetically . . . 
Strictly speaking, a pure self-implantation, involving the loss of 
one's own place external to the other, is hardly possible and in any 
case is absolutely useless and meaningless. Implanting myself into 
another's sufferings, I experience them precisely as his sufferings, 
inside the category of the other . . . (p. 28/26). 
 
Thus, in Bakhtin's exotopical model of dialogism we have the following key 
elements: the basis of knowledge-as-appropriation; (self-) identity; the temporal 
sequence opening onto duration; the theme of the self-domestication of the subject 
armed with knowledge and word, taking place despite (or because of) his 
domineering position--so, Bakhtin's exotopical subject 'must feel [him]self at home 
in the world of other people' (p. 105/111). (Appropriation and domestication--two 
aspects of the same human activity--dominate in both the Rabelaisian-
carnivalesque and exotopical models in Bakhtin's theory).  
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 Whereas self-sacrifice--a manifestation of loss--is totally alien to Bakhtin's 
theory, there is a gift even in his economy of appropriation. Sharing, in a way, the 
given (in advance and 'in succession'), acquired, and accumulated surplus, the 
author bestows on the hero the 'gift of form' which is also the 'gift of love' (pp. 80-
86/84-90). (And again, it is the 'surplus of vision [that] is the bud where the form is 
slumbering' [p. 27/24-25]. This love is strictly controlled by the subject: it is not a 
passion but a compassion or sympathy (cf. etymology: Gr. syn - together; pathos - 
feeling) to a cripple ('a person with disabilities' in proper parlance), a 'relation of 
gift to need, forgiveness gratis to crime, grace to a sinner' (86/90). The borderline 
between this relation and anything more excessive is very exactly located in the 
difference between compassion (sochuvstvie, literally: 'co-feeling') and 'co-
suffering' (sostradanie) which would endanger the authorial exotopy (pp. 19-
20/15-17, 59/59).17 The word and concept sostradanie is extremely rich and 
developed in Russian language, ethics, aesthetics and theology; for instance, it is a 
real mode of existence for many of Dostoevsky heroes, and it takes Bakhtin a great 
deal of dialectical-dialogical skill to circumvent this problem in his writings on 
Dostoevsky.  
 All in all, from the dominant position of exotopy, the relation subject-object 
is characterized by Bakhtin in the following eloquent sequence. 'The other is 
entirely objectivized for me, and his I is only an object for me'; 'completeness of the 
interior and exterior being in the other is experienced [by me] as an abject and 
miserable passivity'; 'the soul of the other [is] the soul-slave' (pp. 40/38, 116-
17/125, 33/32, respectively; emphasis added). On the plane of discourse proper, 
the object corresponds to or is equated with his 'word,' or dialogized speech. 
Accordingly, representation of the object becomes representation of his verbal 
activity (e.g.: 'Characteristic for the novel as a genre is not the image of a man in his 
own right, but a man who is precisely the image of a language' [DN, p. 336]). Thus, 
accordingly to the 'slavish' image of the other, his is the 'language-servant,' crude 
material--that is, reified matter--to be worked with, formed and overcome by the 
subject-author ('Avtor i geroi', pp. 178, 177/192-94). Between it and master's 
(subject's) enframing discourse the opposition is established: 'Word as a means 
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(language) versus word as comprehension. The comprehensive word pertains to 
the domain of goals. Word as the ultimate (highest) goal' ('Iz 70-71', p. 357/134). 
And, vis-à-vis the Calibanian language of an 'under-being' (which is nevertheless 
given to him by the master and is the same language for both), violence - 
supposedly 'loving,' 'compassionate,' in-forming violence - becomes quite justified: 
'artistic completion [is] a kind of violence' ('K pererabotke', p. 335). Here we find a 
most interesting connection between the theme of violence in Bakhtin's dialogism, 
the ideological premise of Bakhtin's anti-poetical stance, suggested by Gasparov, 
and the parallels drawn later by Paul de Man and Michael André Bernstein: the 
first one between Bakhtin's 'dialogized' interlocutor and Hegel's slave in the 
dialectics of master and slave; the second between the same figure in Bakhtin and 
the slave's reactive consciousness in Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals.18 And so, 
in this particular aspect, Bakhtin's exotopical model of relation with the Other 
generates a version of unmistakenly 'colonial discourse' where the 'gift of form' 
proves to be truly poisonous (and characteristic of the 'dialogical imperialism' 
noticed by de Man). 
 At the not very distant limit in this direction, the object is condemned to a 
near total reification, and can actually be seen and treated as thing, even though it 
is a live human body. Here the laws of the laughing culture are enforced, vendange 
of blood is celebrated, and human flesh is chopped like pork liver, all according to 
the following principle: 
 
As a distanced image an object cannot be comical; to be made 
comical, it must be brought close. Everything that makes us laugh 
is close at hand, all comical creativity works in a zone of maximal 
proximity. Laughter has a remarkable power of making an object 
come up close, of drawing it into a zone of crude contact where 
one can finger it familiarly on all sides, turn it upside down, inside 
out, peer at it from above and below, break open its external shell, 
look into its guts, doubt it, take it apart, dismember it, lay it bare 
and expose it, examine it freely and experiment with it. . . . [The 
contact here means] laughter, then abuse, then beating. . . . What 
reigns supreme here is the artistic logic of analysis, dismemberment, 
murdering the object. (EN, pp. 23-24; trans. mod., emphasis 
added)19 
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Thus, it is precisely via reification of the object (but by the same token, and 
unavoidably, of the subject) and violence, that the exotopical model is connected 
with its opposite in terms of exteriority--the anti-distancing familiarity of the 
laughing culture. 
 Similarly to the concept of Other-object, a sequence of shifts occurs with the 
subject-self. Here I will let Bakhtin's text speak for itself: 'Only I-for-myself, unique 
in all being, and all other others-for-me: this is the premise without which there is 
no value and cannot be any value for me . . .'; '[T]o be means to be for the other 
and, through him, for oneself. . . . But the thing is that the real human being is I 
myself . . . I remain the only one in the world' ('Avtor i geroi', pp. 120-21/129; 'K 
pererabotke', pp. 330, 337). And in a later draft from the 70s, dealing with self-
hood, otherness and various possibilities of their relation: 'The 'I' hides in the other 
and others, wants to be only another one for others, wants to enter the world of 
others as other, to discard the burden of the unique in the world I (I-for-myself)' 
('Iz 70-71', p. 371/147, emphasis added; see also 'Avtor i geroi', p. 118/126).20 
With other as just a provisional shelter for the self (again the motif of 'home'), the 
very concept of otherness appears to be potentially undermined. 
 Following this line of thought it becomes difficult to distinguish between the 
authorial and authoritarian word, which is demarcated in the same exotopical way 
and 'requires a distance vis-à-vis itself' (DN, p. 343). In a rather obvious manner a 
conflict also arises with egalitarian ideology, axiomatic for Bakhtin's conception. A 
certain corrective or amortization was required, and it was introduced mainly, 
though not exclusively, in works leaning toward the synthetical 'Dostoevsky' pole. 
The new configuration comes with the individualization of the object. 
 To avoid reification of the object, Bakhtin establishes new parameters, 
interactive in today's parlance, for the relation between the subject and the object; 
here the author engages the hero in an open live dialogue: e.g. Dostoevsky and his 
characters ('K pererabotke', p. 343; PDP passim; PT, N70). First, the hero's 
consciousness is defined as 'in its own right'; furthermore, he becomes upgraded 
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to the status of subject, and now '[f]or the author the hero is not 'he' and not 'I' but 
a fully valid 'thou', that is, another and autonomous 'I' ('thou art'). The hero is the 
subject of a deeply serious, real dialogic mode of address, not the subject of a 
rhetorically performed or conventionally literary [dialogical] one' ('K pererabotke', 
p. 331; Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo pp. 84-85/63).21 
 At its peak, the 'thou-model' quite explicitly contradicts the exotopical one: 
'In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free 
act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an 
externalizing secondhand definition  (PDP, p. 58). At this point, authorial speech and 
the speech of his characters are equalized as 'merely those fundamental 
compositional unities with whose help heteroglossia can enter the novel' (DN, p. 
263). Conversely, authorial function is that of the 'transmission belt,' and the 
author himself is 'only a participant in the dialogue' ('K pererabotke', pp. 343, 341). 
A small detail, however, spoils the picture: Bakhtin adds in parenthesis: 'and its 
organizer [of the dialogue]' (this minimal addition deservedly attracted Todorov's 
attention). From here it goes downhill fast:  '[O]ne may speak of another's 
discourse only with the help of that alien discourse itself, although in the process, it 
is true, the speaker introduces into the other's words his own intentions and 
highlights the context of those words in his own way'; 'An authorial emphasis is 
present of course, in all these orchestrating and distanced elements of language, 
and in the final analysis all these elements are determined by the author's artistic 
will' (DN, pp. 355, 416). The familiar circle is completed; we are back to the 
exotopical 'superexistence,' and the mirage of the 'autonomous I' for the object 
fades away with the very notion of individuality: 'Individual character and 
individual fates . . . are in themselves of no concern for the novel' (p. 333; of course 
one should not forget that for Bakhtin the novel is the utmost realization of the 
dialogical principle as such). 
 Here I would like to dwell additionally on a couple of points in Bakhtin's 
philosophy of act and project, mainly related to the problem of the subject. The 
following paragraph introduces important concepts often analyzed in Bakhtinian 
studies: 'From within my consciousness, co-participating in being, the world is the 
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object of an act: an act of thinking, act of feeling, act of speech, act of doing . . . 
[Objects are opposed to me] in the open, still risky event of (co-) being whose 
unity, meaning and value are not given [dany] but posited [zadany]' ('Avtor i geroi', 
p. 93/97-98). (Characteristically, the unity of the cognitive, ethical and aesthetical 
aspects is again stated by Bakhtin.) The central opposition is that of the highly 
charged notions 'given' and 'posited': the latter generally referring to the ever-
open, incompleted, free, dialogized world (as we already saw, de facto reserved for 
the subject). However, to repeat part of an already quoted passage, it is the 
authoritarian 'unitary language [that] is not something given [dan] but is always in 
essence posited [zadan]--and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to 
the realities of the heteroglossia' (DN, p. 270). The discursive values, but evidently 
not the ideological ones, are altogether reversed here--a split that Bakhtin himself 
would call impossible. To my knowledge, little or no attention has been paid to this 
detail, which, at the very least, compromises the clarity of Bakhtin's concepts and 
terminology.  
  Of course, the 'co-participation in being' (perceptibly slipping back to the 
'superexistence') imposes a certain responsibility ('answerability' in Liapunov's 
translation) on the transgredient author. In terms of 'colonial discourse,' it is a 
kind of 'white man's burden' in regard to the object, the responsibility of giving 
sense to and making sense for this 'abject and miserable passivity' ('Avtor i geroi', 
pp. 116-17/125, 114/122, 119-20/127-29). As to the other, his '[t]emporally 
completed life is hopeless from the point of view of meaning' and 'I rightly relieve 
him of the responsibility that poses a categorical imperative only for myself' (pp. 
119/127, 112-13/120; emphasis added). The real problem of the 'mission, or 
posited givenness' [zadanie, dannost' zadannosti] is defined 'not in categories of 
the temporal being, but in categories of not-yet-being, in categories of goal and 
sense, in the meaningful future inimical to any actual presence of myself in the past 
and the present' (pp. 115-16/123-24). Again, the essence of the project is rigidly 
linked with goal, sense, and priority of the future versus the present. 
 A passage from 'Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti' deals with what 
Bakhtin calls 'the problem of rhythm.' 'Rhythm makes meaning immanent to the 
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experience itself, the goal immanent to the aspiration . . . It presupposes a certain 
hopelessness for meaning . . . [B]eing and responsibility come together as enemies . 
. . In rhythmic being  . . . there is no responsibility for the goal . . . [Here] the totality  
. . . is justified without th[e] future' (pp. 110-12/117-20). Thus, the pure experience 
of being, the rhythm of existence opposes meaning and responsibility of the 
project. A certain analogy to Nietzsche's Dionysian and Apollonian aspects of life 
appears here and is confirmed by further analysis of Bakhtin's texts. To this end I 
will briefly examine Bakhtin's notion of igra (in Russian: play, game and acting in 
the sense of performance), which is antonymically related to responsibility.  
 In the true dialogical spirit, and like all concepts and notions in Bakhtin's 
theory, 'play-game' is not a stable notion. Its trajectory can be most economically 
considered in conjunction with the concepts of laughter (and conversely 
seriousness) and time. In a circular trajectory, Bakhtin's 'laughing cuture of the 
carnival' comes to recognize the 'new,' 'better' seriousness (e.g. RW, pp. 94, 122 et 
passim). Similarly, carnival time -as-crisis is invalidated in duration: for instance, in 
the exotopical model with its spatial-temporal transgredience. By the same token, 
the concept of game as a carnivalized heterogeneous moment--'The stake is similar 
to a crisis . . . [It is] 'life taken out of life'' - is reinscribed into the responsible and 
serious philosophy of act (PDP, pp. 171-72). The conclusive characteristics of 
game-play: it is pure fantasy, a dream - a 'surrogate of life' below the level of 
(serious) representation ('Avtor i geroi', pp. 71-76). At the very best, it attains the 
status of a more or less coherent system, secondary in relation to the primary one 
('real life'). Thus, for instance, 'such a peculiar substitution of different systems - a 
game in a game - ' 'drew the players out of the bonds of everyday life, liberated 
them from usual laws and regulations, and replaced established conventions by 
other lighter conventionalities.'22 It is precisely via the irresponsibility of game and 
play that Nietzsche gets evaluated in the context of project and exotopy. 'The 
aesthetisized philosophy of Nietzsche is a conception which grew on the basis of 
the key moments of the first type of biography': here Bakhtin defines Nietzsche's 
work in terms of the adventuresque-heroic type of the biographical genre, one of 
the constituent moments or value of which is 'gambling [playing] with . . . life, 
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devoid of any responsibility in the unified and unique event of (co-)being' ('Avtor i 
geroi', pp. 148/160, 147/158; emphasis added). This kind of creativity is also 
shown to be on the side of rhythm in the indicated opposition, and, furthermore, it 
is minimally exotopical, due to the maximal proximity of the author and the hero. 
Finally, and somewhat unexpectedly for present-day views on Nietzsche, the 
author and the hero in this genre represent a 'naive individualism linked to naive 
and ingenuous parasitism' (p. 144/156). Of course there is a direct correlation 
between the (critical) attitude toward Nietzsche indicated here and the analogy 
between the participant in Bakhtin's dialogue and Nietzschean slave, noted by 
Bernstein. 
 On the other hand, Bakhtin's notion of responsibility obviously has much to 
do with Hegel. Thus, Bakhtin proposes what is a rather faithful version of the 
Hegelian (and subsequently Engelsian) formula: 'The better a man understands his 
determinedness (his thingness) the closer he is to understanding and realizing his 
true freedom' ('Iz 70-71', pp. 362-63). Note that here Bakhtin actually establishes 
common parameters for responsibility and reification. 
 Up to this point in Bakhtin's conception, the relation to the Other was seen 
in parameters of domination, at best a stale-mate. 'Inexhaustability of the second 
consciousness, that is of the consciousness understanding and answering: there is 
a potential infinity of answers, languages, codes. Infinity versus infinity' ('Iz 70-71', 
pp. 359-60/136; emphasis added; cf. 'K pererabotke', pp. 331-32). But despite the 
observed shifts of attitude, the “ultimate positions in being are taken” (Bakhtin's 
expression), and the borders between the world of the author and the represented 
world of the other are 'sharp and categorical' (FTC, p. 253). A symmetrically 
mirroring picture appears when the situation is transposed into a new perspective. 
 The transgredient vision of the author resolves the problem of the 'blind 
spot' of vision and knowledge for the hero but not for the author himself (since a 
full-fledged self-representation is impossible, and attempts to achieve it can lead 
only to the precarious doubling and to 'naive and parasitic individualism' of a 
Nietzschean kind). Thus appears the third Other, the 'higher super addressee,' the 
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'loophole addressee': all-seeing and, hopefully, understanding and benevolent (like 
the good master already portrayed) ('Problema teksta', p. 323/126). In fact, his 
existence is implicit in dialogism, since the word wants to, and must be, heard, 
answered, and understood. At the same time, despite the 'fully valid "thou",' the 
(abject and slavish) 'hero' cannot comprehend the author, give sense to his speech. 
And, since the exotopical position of the subject-author applies to any other on the 
same plane of existence as his (they are all 'heroes'), only a higher comprehending 
entity can resolve the problem. 
 This Other is called, in ascending succession: artist, author, author-creator, 
Dostoevsky, Author (with capital A), divine artist, Prometheus, and God--the latter 
quite logically completing the succession (EST86 passim).23 Generally, in the texts 
collected in Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva, Bakhtin speaks of God explicitly, often, 
and in a reverential tone appropriate for the true believer.24 The following 
quotation, although not the most characteristic in this respect, is from one of the 
most famous passages in Bakhtin, which is widely interpreted in a sense different 
from the one proposed here: 
 
It is impossible to prove one's alibi in the event of being. Nothing 
answerable, serious, and significant can exist where that alibi 
becomes a presupposition for creation and utterance. Special 
answerability is indispensable (in an autonomous domain of 
culture) - one cannot create directly in God's world. This 
specialization of answerability, however, can be founded only 
upon a deep trust in the highest level of authority that blesses a 
culture - upon trust, that is, in the fact that there is another - the 
highest other - who answers for my own special answerability, 
and trust in the fact that I do not act in an axiological void. Outside 
this trust, only empty pretensions are possible. (AH, p. 206) 
 
The obvious complication here is that this answer of the highest other is 
undistinguishable from the 'other's sanctified word, and sanctified and 
authoritarian word in general' ('Iz 70-71', p. 356/133). Thus: 'Often the 
authoritative word is in fact a word spoken by another in a foreign language (cf. for 
example the phenomenon of foreign-language religious texts in most cultures' (DN, 
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p. 343 note; emphasis added). Both 'speech in other language' (inoiazychie) and the 
authoritarian word are, at the outset of Bakhtin's theory, posed as limits for 
dialogism and yet both de facto merge here, in his profession of faith.  
 Here we may recall the issue of Bakhtin's religiosity. He was, of course, an 
orthodox Christian; but he also was a man of a profoundly dialectical or dialogical 
persuasion (cf. the already quoted 'Dialectics was born from dialogue, in order to 
return to it on a higher level' and 'Dialectics is an abstract product of the dialogue' 
['K metodologii', p. 384/162; 'K pererabotke', p. 337]). His own authorial ideas, 
such as the postulates of the laughing culture or dialogism, almost seem to attain 
the status of religious dogma for Bakhtin. This may explain a remark that sounds 
shocking to an orthodox believer's ears, the one made in a private conversation 
and 'in a conspiratorial tone of voice': 'The New Testament is also a carnival.'25 Be 
that as it may, and even if God is left as a skeleton in a personal closet of the anti-
authoritarian – heteroglot - free-thinker Bakhtin (as he is most often portrayed), 
the following list of positive instances and possible avatars of the 'loophole 
addressee' reads rather as an enumeration of logocentric values, obviously with 
certain ideological preferences: 'God, absolute truth, the court of impartial human 
conscience, the people, court of history, science, and so forth' ('Problema teksta', p. 
323/126). 
 On any level of analysis, the contradictory character of Bakhtin's thought 
remains always in play. As an alternative to the conception of the authorial truth 
we might recall a conclusion based on significantly different, 'Rabelaisian-
carnivalesque' and collective, premises. Criticizing the 'monistic principle' of the 
'unity of consciousness,' Bakhtin contends that 
 
[i]t should be pointed out that the single and unified 
consciousness is by no means an inevitable consequence of the 
concept of a unified [unique, single] truth that requires a plurality 
of consciousnesses, one that cannot in principle be fitted into the 
bounds of a single consciousness, one that is, so to speak, by its 
very nature full of event potential and is born at a point of contact 
among various consciousnesses. (PDP, p. 81)26 
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One can again comment, parenthetically, on the Borg-like character of this 
universal 'truth,' accessible only to a plurality of consciousness.27 In a close 
analysis, however, it seems possible, on a certain level, to reconcile the collective 
and the exotopical models. The former seems to be antithetical to the latter in 
terms of the collectivity - individuality opposition. But collective consciousness and 
truth, just as the 'ring of the finalizing authorial consciousness' present, in fact, the 
same encompassing structure, and in this major sense they both are exotopic 
('Avtor i geroi', p. 17/13). By the same token, the collective may be considered just 
a quantitative growth of the 'intersection of two consciousness' (with all that 
follows in Bakhtin's argument) ('K pererabotke', p. 332).28 Thus, in a conclusive 
evaluation of the controversy of 'Rabelais' versus 'Goethe,' the exotopical model 
seems to prevail, at any rate in aspects of gnoseology ('Dostoevsky'). And, be it in 
the 'collective consciousness' model or in the highest 'loophole addressee,' the 
actual human personality becomes lost, different aspects of the full-fledged human 
life lose their immediate givenness and rather become posited 'image of language,' 
'image of idea,' 'sense of theory,' and even: 'Not a belief . . . but a sense of belief' (p. 
338). 
 Overall, two configurations may be distinguished in Bakhtin's conception of 
the Other. First, the Other dominated and appropriated in the dialogic relation, 
parameters of which are established in the authorial power-range of the exotopical 
subject; it is, therefore, only a provisional Other. The second is the 'primary author' 
or the subject, exotopic to any given level of the 'secondary authorship.' This is the 
irreducible Other, outside the possibility of adequate knowledge by a 'secondary 
author' (who is thus put on the plane of protagonist), and thus potentially (and 
eventually, considering the 'temporal succession') excluded from dialogue. 
 
Primary, not created, and secondary author (the image of the 
author created by the primary author). Primary author - natura 
non creata quae creat, secondary author - natura creata quae 
creat. Image of the hero - natura creata quae non creat. The 
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primary author cannot be an image: he escapes any imaginative 
conception . . . That is why the primary author is draped in silence. 
('Iz 70-71', p. 373/148-49; emphasis added)29 
 
Here, still in the frame of Bakhtin's predominant authorial model, the 
exotopical and authoritative Author, the Other, acquires specific features of deus 
otiosus and is somewhat pessimistically defined in terms of silence in his (lack of) 
response to the eagerness of the 'last questions' posed by participants - 
intermediate 'authors' - in the presumably all-embracing and all-permeating 
dialogue. This silence is never absolutized by Bakhtin as a negative principle and 
can even 'adapt different forms of expression, different forms of the reduced 
laughter (irony), of allegorical narration etc.' ('Iz 70-71', p. 373/149). Still, it 
remains as a dark shadow on the horizon of meaningful discursive logic and, for 
instance, can be recognized precisely in the carnivalized literature, since 
'[l]aughter is a specific relationship to reality, but not the one that can be 
translated into logical thought' (PDP, p. 164). Moreover, the concepts of meaning 
and of truth itself seem to be seriously jeopardized here, since '[a]nswers to 
questions is what I call 'meanings'' ('Iz 70-71', p. 369/145; emphasis added). 
 On the other side, the staunch logocentric credo in the ultimate truth seems 
to be at odds with (although in the overall scope of Bakhtin's thought it manifestly 
outweighs) his somewhat 'poststructuralist' formulation of the endless dialogue 
where there is 'no first or last word' nor 'first or last meaning' ('K metodologii', pp. 
393/170, see also p. 391/168; 'Iz 70-71'  p.370/145-46). Thus, Bakhtin's 
optimistic and positivistic thrust sometimes seems to be thwarted as to the 
cognizability of the final truth; in other words, a certain imbalance between 
ontology and epistemology appears. 
 Nevertheless, and however suggestive may seem Bakhtin's formulations 
concerning the dualistic relation subject - object or self - other, he never openly 
questions the fundamental values of knowledge, sense (meaning), and final truth, 
even when it is relegated on a certain level to the competence of the ever-receding 
Author. 
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Meaning, truth, and otherness are inseparable in Bakhtin's theory: truth is a 
valorized (first of all, ideologically valorized) meaning and is expressed in 
utterance by a subject or the secondary subject - between whom the relation of 
otherness exists. In terms of truth, Bakhtin's position may be summed up thus: 
'The truth is out there. Only it may be not cognizable to an individual. Or maybe not 
to anybody.' But Bakhtin himself never explicitly crosses the line of ontological 
disbelief, and in all versions language and discourse - 'names, definitions and value 
judgements' - remain at the very least a 'hypothesis of meaning' prodding the 
'sober and fearless knowledge of the [historical] process' (DN, p. 278; Voprosy 
literatury i estetiki  (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1975), p. 182; RW, p. 
237). 
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and Michael André Bernstein, 'The Poetics of Ressentiment'', ibid., pp. 197-223. In the present 
essay, it is not the only time that Hegel and Nietzsche appear as points of, respectively, 
attraction and rejection for Bakhtin. However, a specialized approach to the theme of Bakhtin 
vis-à-vis Hegel and Nietzsche requires an in-depth analysis, which is beyond my scope here. 
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19 Emphasized segments replace the following in Emerson and Holquist's translation: 'subject . 
. . center . . . laughter means abuse, and abuse could lead to blows . . . turning things into dead 
objects.'     
20 Bakhtin unambiguously writes here from gnoseological positions (cf. the headline of the 
passage: 'Essays on philosophical anthropology'). I would like to underscore once again that 
his, from time to time proclaimed, differentiation between aesthetical, ethical and 
gnoseological approaches is not rigorous and he easily transgresses categorical boundaries. 
21 Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 2nd edn, 1963). The bracketed 
'dialogical' is omitted in Emerson's translation. Is this 'dialogical' 'just' a lapsus on Bakhtin's 
part, or more: a Freudian 'slip of tongue'? 
22 Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodhaia kul'tura srednevekov'a i Renessansa (Moscow: 
Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1965) p. 252; RW, p. 235, emphasis added.The quotation from 
Tvorchestvo is omitted in Iswolsky's translation. 
23 In the light of Boris Groys' interpretation, Stalin may be added to Bakhtin's list of authorities 
(cf. Boris Groys, 'Mezhdu Stalinym i Dionisom', in Sintaksis 25 (1989): pp. 92-97). 
24 For the most part these texts were published after Bakhtin's death; thus, considerations of 
ideological (anti-religious) censorship and potential--and eventual--repressive measures are 
mainly uplifted here, which were to different extent imminent, probable or possible at 
different stages of his life. 
25 Qtd in M.M. Bakhtin i filosofskaia kul'tura dvadtsatogo veka (Peterburg: RGPU, 1991), p. 28. 
26 Bakhtin links the themes of collectivity versus individuality, project and work, and the very 
principle of cognition thus: 'All objects--the sun, the stars, the earth, the sea and so forth--are 
present to man not as objects of an uninvolved thinking, but exclusively as part of the 
collective process of labor and the battle against nature' (FTC, p. 209; trans. mod.). By the 
same token,  'collective labor concerns itself for the future: men sow for the future, gather in 
the harvest for the future, mate and copulate for the sake of the future'--the last one is a 
rather unorthodox example of 'collective labor' (p. 207). 
27 Cf. the following formula: 'The individual feels that he is an indissoluble part of the 
collectivity, a member of the people's mass body. In this whole the individual body ceases to a 
certain extent to be itself; it is possible, so to say, to exchange bodies, to be renewed . . .' (RW, 
p. 255). Sometimes it almost seems likely that the creators of 'Star Trek: Voyager' consulted 
Bakhtin's text. 
28 On the subject of the quantitative growth (characteristic of the economy of appropriation) 
cf. Bakhtin's scathing the 'numerous philosophical, ethical, philosophical-historical, 
metaphysical, religious theories that we can call impoverishing theories insofar as they tend to 
explain a productive event by impoverishing it, first of all by the quantitative reduction of the 
participants' ('Avtor i geroi', p. 83/87). 
29 'It is striking to note that the scholastic definition Bakhtin uses to identify the author was 
applied, in its original context (for example by John Scotus Erigena), to God and to him alone' 
(Todorov T. Literature and Its Theorists [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987], p. 81). Bakhtin 
recurrently uses this and similar Latin formulae. The analogous 'natura  naturans' and 'natura  
naturata' are known from Latin translations of Averroes and from Spinosa's texts (cf. EST86, p. 
428 n). 
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